A team problem formulation of distributed stochastic differential systems with decentralized noisy information structures is considered, and a stochastic Pontryagin's maximum principle is applied to derive sufficient team and person-by-person optimality conditions. The sufficient conditions are given in terms of local convexity conditions of the Hamiltonian, and the corresponding conditional variational equations. These appear to be analogous to the convexity of the pay-off, in the action spaces, of static team problems. The stochastic maximum principle is applied to several examples in filtering and control.
Team Optimality Conditions of Distributed [4] , [22] , [23] , and applying dynamic programming using the concept of common information [5] , [19] . However, for general stochastic dynamical systems, identifying conditions so that person-by-person optimality implies team optimality has not been addressed.
In this paper, we apply stochastic Pontryagin's maximum principle to derive sufficient team and person-by-person optimality conditions for distributed stochastic differential systems with decentralized noisy information structures. The sufficient conditions are given in terms of local convexity conditions on the Hamiltonian and conditional variational equations. These may be viewed as analogous to corresponding results in Static Team Theory [8] , [20] , [21] . The methodology is based on lifting the dynamic constraints, as in fully observable stochastic optimal control problems, using the stochastic maximum principle, described by a "Hamiltonian System of Equations," which consist of a Hamiltonian functional and forward and backward stochastic differential equations, and then invoking conditional optimality with respect to DMs having access to different information structures. Upon performing a state variable augmentation, the approach is similar to the one used for noiseless information structures in [24] , subject to some technical details. However, the results obtained in [24] hold for decentralized noiseless information structures, and these are not necessarily applicable to decentralized noisy information structures, unless Girsanov's theorem is applied. In fact, certain technicalities must be addressed to extend the results to noisy information structures, which are inherited from the difference of centralized fully observable versus partially observable stochastic optimal control [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] . Moreover, for noisy information structures the framework of nonlinear filtering, becomes part of computing the optimal decentralized strategies.
The specific contributions of this paper are the following.
1) Derive sufficient conditions for team and person-byperson optimality, using Pontryagin's stochastic maximum principle, for stochastic differential systems with decentralized noisy information structures. 2) Apply the stochastic maximum principle to several examples in decentralized filtering and control.
The nonlinear filtering aspects are elaborated through the examples presented. Moreover, an interesting relation to mean field stochastic optimal control is identified, for a class of decentralized stochastic systems, which states that the optimal team actions of any one of the decision makes is a function of the mean values of the optimal responses of all other decision makers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we formulate the distributed stochastic system with decentralized information structures. In Section II-C, we introduce the main 0018-9286 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
technical assumptions. Section III is devoted to the development of sufficient conditions for team and person-by-person optimality via the stochastic maximum principle. Section IV investigates several examples in decentralized filtering and control. The connection to mean field stochastic optimal control is described in Section IV-B.
II. DISTRIBUTED STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL TEAMS
In this section we introduce the mathematical formulation of distributed stochastic systems, and the definitions of collaborative decisions via team optimality and person-by-person optimality.
Let (Ω, F, {F 0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}, P) denote a probability space with filtration, satisfying the usual conditions [35] . Throughout it is assumed that all filtrations are right continuous and complete [35] , and F T {F 0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}. Define the following spaces.
C([0, T ], R n ) : space of continuous function on [0, T ] with sup norm topology |z| C([0,T ],R n ) sup t∈[0,T ] |z(t)| R n .
which is a sub-Hilbert space of L 2 ([0, T ], L 2 (Ω, R n )).
tr (Σ * (t)Σ(t)) dt < ∞.
A. Distributed Stochastic System
On the fixed probability space (Ω, F, {F 0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}, P) we are given a distributed stochastic dynamical decision system, consisting of an interconnection of N subsystems labeled by elements of the set Z N {1, 2, . . . , N}. Each subsystem i ∈ Z N has, state variable x i ∈ R n i , control or decision variable u i ∈ A i ⊂ R d i , where A i is closed and convex, an exogenous state noise variable W i ∈ R m i , an exogenous measurement noise variable B i ∈ R k i , and initial state x i (0) = x i 0 , defined by (S1) x i (0) = x i 0 : an R n i -valued Random Variable; (S2) {W i (t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}: an R m i -valued standard Brownian motion which models the exogenous state noise, adapted to F T , independent of x i (0); (S3) {B i (t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}: an R k i -valued standard Brownian motion which models the exogenous measurement noise, adapted to F T , independent of {W i (t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}. For each i, the observation process {y i (t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} in an R k i -dimensional process corrupted by noise generated via the stochastic differential equation
The filtration F T {F 0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]} is defined as follows. Introduce the σ-algebras
and the minimum σ-algebras generated by these as follows:
For each t ∈ [0, T ], i∈ Z N , the actions of the DMs u i (t) ∈ A i are generated by control processes which are progressively measurable processes [35] with respect to {G y i 0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}. This implies, for each i ∈ Z N , there exist nonanticipative measurable functionals μ i (·, ·) of decentralized partial information struc-
In the above formulation the Brownian motions and measure P are fixed, independent of the decisions u. However, y i (·) ≡ y i,u (·), x i (·) ≡ x i,u (·), G y i 0,· ≡ G y i,u 0,· , ∀ i ∈ Z N , i.e., they dependent on u. Observations (1) model channels with memory; they include decentralized filtering applications, by making the right side of (5) independent on u = (u 1 , . . . , u N ).
Next, we introduce the admissible set of controls for decentralized decisions.
Definition 1-(Admissible Controls of the DMs): Let
The pre-admissible set of controls for DM i are square-integrable progressively measurable processes with respect to the filtration G y i T , defined bỹ
The admissible set of controls for DM i is a subset
An N tuple of DM controls is defined by
In the next section we introduce Lipschitz and linear growth conditions so that any solution (1) and (5) is {F 0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}−adapted, also called strong solution (see [30] and [35] ).
Define the augmented vectors by
The above stochastic system is described in compact form by
where
is called the signal of the observation equation (8) .
B. Pay-Off and Team and Person-by-Person Optimality
Given a u ∈ U (N ) [0, T ], consider the distributed system (7), (8) , and define the pay-off or performance criterion by
is called the running cost function and ϕ : R n −→ (−∞, ∞], the terminal cost function.
Next, we define team and person-by-person optimality. Definẽ
Problem 1-(Team and Person-by-Person Optimality):
Given the pay-off functional (9) , constraints (7) , (8) 
and it is called person-by-person optimal if it satisfies
Any u o ∈ U (N ) [0, T ] satisfying (10) [resp. (11) ] is called an optimal team (resp. person-by-person) decision and the cor-
[satisfying (7) and (8)] are the optimal state and observation processes, respectively. We assume optimal controls exist. For team optimality the objective is to find a global optimal
when each DM has access to a different information structure (decentralized).
For person-by-person optimality the objective is to find an
are fixed to their optimal responses, for i = 1, 2, . . . , N.
Person-by-person optimality (11) is weaker compared to team optimality (10) , because the validity of the N inequalities of person-by-person optimality is necessary but not sufficient for any (u 1,o , . . . , u N,o ) ∈ U (N ) [0, T ] to be team optimal. However, since every team optimal strategy is necessarily a person-by-person optimal strategy, the objective is to identify sufficient conditions so that a person-by-person optimal
C. Strong Solutions
In this section we introduce assumptions which will allow us to show existence of strong F T -adapted continuous solutions to (7) and (8) (see [35] ). Then we describe how to transform (7) and (8) so that the stochastic minimum principle derived in [24] and [34] (which is for noiseless information structures), is applicable to noisy information structures defined by (1) .
denote the space of F T -adapted R n valued second order random processes endowed with the norm topology · defined by
The existence of strong solution is based on the following assumptions.
Assumptions 1-(Main Assumptions):
The coefficients in (7) and (8) are Borel measurable maps
These satisfy the following basic conditions.
There exists a K > 0 such that
The Lipschitz and linear growth conditions are needed to ensure strong existence and uniqueness of solutions. The following lemma proves the existence of solutions and their continuous dependence on the decision variables. Lemma 1: Suppose Assumptions 1 hold. Then for any F 0,0measurable initial state x 0 having finite second moment, and any u ∈ U (N ),y [0, T ] the following hold.
(1) System (7), (8) has a unique solution (
(2) The solution of system (7) , (8) is continuously dependent on the control, in the sense that, as the sequence of controls converges,
(1) Consider the augmented system X (x, y) and the associated stochastic differential equation of X. The proof for the first part of the lemma is classical and hence omitted. (2) Next, we consider the second part asserting the continuity of u to solution map u −→ (x, y). Let {{u i,α : i = 1, 2, . . . , N}, u o } be any pair of DM strategies from
denote the corresponding pair of solutions of the system (7), (8) .
. By the definition of solution to (7) , it can be verified that
(12) Using the standard martingale inequality into (12) , it follows from it and (A1), (A4) that there exist constants C 1 , C 2 > 0 such that:
Clearly, by the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, and martingale inequality, it follows from (A2), (A5) that:
Similarly, by (A8)
The integrands in the right side of inequalities (14) , (15) converge to zero for almost all s ∈ [0, T ], P-a.s., and dominated by integrable functions. Hence, by Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem the terms {e α 1 , e α 2 } converge to zero uniformly on
Then by Gronwall inequality applied to ρ α , it can be shown that
Next, we introduce the augmented system of (x, y), which is used in the next section to derive sufficient team and person-byperson optimality conditions. Define the augmented vectors
. . , y N ) ∈ R k and the augmented drift and diffusion coefficients, and terms in the pay-off by
. Then the augmented system is expressed in compact form by
Given a u ∈ U (N ) [0, T ], the analog of pay-off (9) with respect to the augmented variables is
For existence of solutions to the equations associated with the stochastic maximum principle, we shall require stronger regularity conditions on the maps {f, σ, h}, and the running and terminal pay-off functions { , ϕ}. These are given below. Assumptions 2: E|x(0)| 2 R n < ∞ and the maps of {f, σ, , ϕ} satisfy the following conditions.
x, u) and continuously differentiable with respect to (x, u).
x, y) and continuously differentiable with respect to (x, y).
(B7) Condition (A9) of Assumptions 1 hold. In Assumptions 2, the conditions on the derivatives f u , σ u , u can be relaxed by considering relaxed strategies (i.e., strategies which are conditional distributions [34] ), when stating the maximum principle.
III. TEAM AND PERSON-BY-PERSON OPTIMALITY CONDITIONS
In this section, we derive optimality conditions, by using two methods; the strong formulation, and the weak Girsanov measure transformation. We compare the optimality conditions, and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the two formulations, with respect to identifying sufficient conditions so that any person-by-person optimal strategy is team optimal.
A. Sufficient Optimality Conditions Based on Strong Formulation
First, we introduce the Hamiltonian system of equations, of the augmented system (17) and pay-off (18) using the strong formulation, under Assumptions 2, and then we derive sufficient team and person-by-person optimality conditions.
Define the Hamiltonian
For
) of the augmented system is unique and satisfies the following backward stochastic differential equation:
The augmented system (17) is expressed in terms of the Hamiltonian as follows:
Special Case, h(t, x, y) = h(t, x) (i.e., independent of y). In this case, a simplified Hamiltonian system of equations is obtained by introducing the following decomposition of the adjoint process (Ψ, Q):
By (21), the second component of Ψ in (23) satisfies
Since this equation has terminal condition ζ(T ) = 0, a.s., and its right-hand side martingale terms are orthogonal, then necessarily, q 21 (t) = 0, q 22 (t) = 0, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], a.s., which imply ζ(t) = 0, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], a.s. By using decomposition (23) and (20) and (21), we have the following simplified Hamiltonian system of equations. Define the Hamiltonian
For u ∈ U (N ) [0, T ] the adjoint process is (25) and satisfies the backward stochastic differential equation
x is the derivative of σ (j) with respect to the state, Q (j) is the jth column of Q, for j = 1, 2, . . . , m.
The state and observation processes satisfy the equation
Next, we employ the Hamiltonian system of equations, to show, under local convexity conditions on the Hamiltonian, that any (
satisfying a set of conditional variational equations is person-by-person optimal, and that such a (u 1,o , . . . , u N,o ) ∈ U (N ) [0, T ] is also team optimal. The results are stated in the next theorem.
Theorem 1-(Sufficient Conditions for Team Optimality):
Consider strategies from U (N ) [0, T ], under Assumptions 2, and A i is closed, bounded and convex subset of
) denote an admissible state, observation and decision pair and let (ψ o (·), q o 11 (·), q o 12 (·)) the corresponding adjoint processes.
Suppose the following conditions hold.
) is a person-by-person optimal if it satisfies the following conditional variational inequalities:
Moreover, u o (·) = (u 1,o (·), . . . , u N,o (·)) is team optimal. Part II. General Case, h(t, x, y). Suppose (C5) holds and (C4) is replaced by
Then the statements of Part I hold for the Hamiltonian system (20)-(22) (i.e., in (30) the Hamiltonian is replaced by H(t, X, Ψ, Q, u)).
Proof: Part I. We show, under the stated conditions, team optimality of u o (·) = (u 1,o (·), . . . , u N,o (·)), since person-byperson optimality is a special case of team optimality. Let u o (·) = (u 1,o (·), . . . , u N,o (·)) ∈ U (N ) [0, T ] satisfying (30) be a candidate for an optimal team decision and u ∈ U (N ) [0, T ] any other decision. Then
By the convexity of ϕ(·) then
Substituting (32) into (31) yields
and then taking expectation we obtain the following:
Since
Since by hypothesis
Substituting (36) into (35) yields
By (30) and by definition of conditional expectation we have
Hence, sufficiency of (30) is shown.
Part II. This case is done precisely, as Part I. By Theorem 1, under the local convexity conditions, any admissible (u 1,o , . . . , u N,o ) which satisfies the set of conditional variational equations (30) is person-by-person optimal, in the sense that it implies the validity of N inequalities of (11), and such a person-by-person optimal strategy is also team optimal. This implies, under the local convexity conditions, that the validity of the N inequalities of person-by-person optimality is not only necessary, but also sufficient for any (u 1,o , . . . , u N,o ) ∈ U (N ) [0, T ] to be team optimal.
The conditional variational equation (30) and the local convexity conditions (C4), (C5) or (C4'), (C5) appear to be analogous to the static team optimality conditions, given by a set of variational inequalities corresponding to person-by-person optimality, and convexity of the pay-off in the actions spaces [8] , [20] , [21] .
Remark 1: Theorem 1, can be extended to include state and control constraints, via Lagrange's method, by redefining the pay-off to include the constraints. Consider, for example, the following integral constraints:
. . , M, satisfy the conditions of ( , ϕ),
for i = 1, . . . , M. By introducing Lagrange multipliers, λ i ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , M, (and assuming the constraint and unconstraint problems are equivalent), it can be shown that all previous results hold with the following changes:
In the next remark, we describe an approach which is helpful to identify the martingale term in the adjoint process.
Remark 2: According to [24] , the Riesz representation theorem for Hilbert space martingales, determine the martingale term of the adjoint process
By translating this to the original system then q 11 = ψ x σ, q 12 = ψ y D 1/2 , provided the derivatives ψ x , ψ y exist.
Remark 3 : We point out that Theorem 1 can be easily generalized to admissible controls for DM i, which are squareintegrable processes adapted to filtration G i
An N tuple of generalized DM strategies is
. For example, for N = 2, we can consider G 1 0,t = σ{y 1 (s),
This models decentralized problems with information sharing or nested information structures.
Since the derivation of Theorem 1 holds, for u ∈ U (N ) S [0, T ], then we have the following generalization stated as a Corollary. 
, under Assumptions 2, and A i is closed, bounded and convex subset of R k i , i = 1, . . . N. Then the statements of Theorem 1 hold with G y i 0,t replaced by G i 0,t , i = 1, . . . , N.
B. Optimality Conditions Based on Girsanov's Measure Transformation
In this section we consider the weak Girsanov formulation [26] , [29] , [35] , [36] . Thus, we start with the transformed equivalent of a problem similar to Problem 1, on a reference probability measure, in which the observations are Brownian motions. Then we state necessary conditions for team and person-by-person optimality based on a Pontryagin's maximum principle derived on the reference probability measure. Moreover, we show under certain local convexity conditions of the Hamiltonian involving the Radon-Nikodym derivative associated with Girsanov's measure transformation, that any
T ] which is person-by-person optimal is also team optimality. The only disadvantage is that the local convexity conditions are too restrictive compared to those of Theorem 1.
The material of this section are based on the following assumptions.
Assumptions 3: Conditions (B1)-(B6) of Assumptions 2 hold, condition (A9) of Assumptions 1 holds, and h is uniformly bounded.
Team and Person-by-Person Optimality on Reference
Probability Space: On a reference probability space (Ω, F, P), the following are defined:
Let
Definition 2-(Pre-Admissible Controls of the DMs):
Given
, the set of pre-admissible strategies for DM i are defined bỹ
e. in t, P−a.s., u i (·)is G i T −progressivelymeas. , i= 1, . . . ,N where A i are closed, bounded and convex, for i = 1, . . . , N.
An N tuple of generalized pre-admissible DM controls is defined by (u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u N ) ∈Ũ (N )
T ]} denote the solution of the stochastic differential equation
By Assumptions 3, for any x(0) with finite second moment,
The admissible strategies are defined as follows.
Definition 3-(Admissible Controls of the DMs):
The admissible controls of DM i are defined by
An N tuple of generalized DM strategies is defined by
T ]} is a martingale and the unique {F 0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}−adapted continuous solution of the following stochastic differential equation:
(46) On the reference probability space (Ω, F, P), given a u ∈ U (N ) [0, T ], define the pay-off by
(47)
Problem 2-(Team and Person-by-Person Optimality):
On the reference probability space (Ω, F, P), given the payoff functional (47), and constraints (41), (43), the N tuple
and it is called person-by-person optimal if it satisfies 
Team and Person-by-Person Optimality on Original
Probability Space: Next, we show that Problem 2 is the transformed equivalent of another problem defined on another probability measure P u (which depends on u), of the type described in Problem 1, with E{·} in (9) replaced by E u {·} (i.e., the measure is P u ).
Since, for u ∈ U (N )
By Girsanov's theorem, on the probability space (Ω, F, P u ), the
is a standard Brownian motion, for i = 1, . . . , N. Finally, by (41) and (51) the observations are defined, for i = 1, . . . , N, by
and the state process {x(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is defined by (43) (its distribution is unchanged). Using (50) into (47), on the probability space (Ω, F, {F 0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}, P u ), the pay-off is
. . , N. From the above construction, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2: On the reference probability space
is team optimal (resp. person-by-person optimal) with respect to Problem 2, (48) [resp. (49)] if and only if on the probability space (Ω, F, {F 0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}, P u ) it is team optimal (resp. person-by-person optimal) with respect to pay-off functional (53) (resp.J(u −i,o , u i ), i = 1, . . . , N), and constraints (43), (52).
Proof: Follows from the above construction.
Hamiltonian System on Reference Probability Space-
(Ω, F, P): Next, the Hamiltonian system of equations is introduced, and subsequently used to describe the team and person-by-person optimality conditions on the reference probability space (Ω, F, P) for the augmented state X
T ]} are solutions of (46), (43), and the pay-off is (47). That is, we describe the optimality conditions with respect to Problem 2.
The Hamiltonian system of equations (necessary conditions for person-by-person optimality) can be derived following: [26] , [29] , [36] or applying the method in [24] to the augmented process {X(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}. Define the following quantities:
Define the Hamiltonian of the augmented state X {Λ, x} ∈ R n by
For any u ∈ U (N ) R n+1 ) ) satisfies the following BSDEs:
x, y), ζ , V q 22 , ζ = tr(q * 22 σ(t, x, u; ζ)), t ∈ [0, T ], and the state equations are given by
(58) The necessary and sufficient conditions for team and personby-person optimality are presented in the next theorem. 
to be team optimal (with respect to Problem 2), it is necessary that the following hold:
is a unique solution of (55), (56) such that u o ∈ U (N )
For an element
)) to be person-by-person optimal (with respect to Problem 2), it is necessary that (1)-(3) the following hold.
Part II-Sufficient Conditions for Team and Person-by-
) the corresponding adjoint process satisfying (55), (56).
Suppose the following conditions hold:
Then u o (·) = (u 1,o (·), . . . , u N,o (·)) is person-by-person optimal if it satisfies (60).
Moreover, such a u o (·) = (u 1,o (·), . . . , u N,o (·)) is also team optimal.
Proof: Part I. Statements (1), (2) concerning team optimality can be obtained by invoking any variational method of stochastic maximum principle, for example, [26] , [29] , [34] or [36] . Statement (3), specifically, (60) follows by evaluating (59) at
for i = 1, . . . , N (i.e., any team optimal is necessarity personby-person optimal), then taking conditional expectation, and applying standard techniques to remove the integral over [0, T ]. Statements (1)-(3) concerning person-by-person optimality, are similar; the only difference is that for each i, we apply the variational methods to u i ∈ U i [0, T ] while all others are kept fixed to the optimal responses u −i = (u 1,o , u 2,o , . . . , u i−1,o , u i+1,o ,  . . . , u N 
. . , N. Part II. This part is shown by using pay-off J Λ (u), and following the derivation of Theorem 1. 
IV. APPLICATIONS IN FILTERING AND CONTROL
In this section we investigate various applications of the optimality conditions to decentralized filtering and control. The dynamics and the reward have the structures defined below. These are assumed to satisfy the convexity conditions of Theorem 1, (C4), (C5), why imply sufficiency of (30).
Definition 4-(Team Problems With Special Structure): Nonlinear Form (NF):
A team problem is said to have "nonlinear form" if
and σ (i) (·, ·) is the ith column of an n × m matrix σ(·, ·), for i = 1, 2, . . . , m, R(·, ·) is symmetric uniformly positive definite, and λ(·, ·) is uniformly positive semidefinite.
Linear-Quadratic Form (LQF):
A team problem is said to have "Linear-Quadratic Form" if the dynamics and pay-off functions are of the form
and R(·) is symmetric uniformly positive definite and H(·), N (·) are symmetric uniformly positive semidefinite. Case NF: Utilizing the definition of Hamiltonian of Theorem 1, its derivative is given by
The explicit expression for u i,o (t) is given by
Case LQF: For a team problem of LQF the optimal strategies are given by
The previous equation involve conditional expectations. These can be computed by first determining the adjoint processes. The procedure is described in the next subsection.
A. LQF and Linear Observations
In this section we invoke the minimum principle to compute the optimal strategies for distributed stochastic dynamical decision systems consisting of an interconnection of two subsystems (i.e., N = 2), each governed by a linear stochastic differential equation with coupling, and then discuss generalizations to arbitrary subsystems.
Subsystem Dynamics 1 & 2:
For any t ∈ [0, T ] the feedback information structure of u 1 (t) of subsystem 1 is the σ-algebra G y 1,u 0,t σ{y 1 (s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t}, and the feedback information structure of u 2 (t) of subsystem 2 is the σ-algebra G y 2,u 0,t σ{y 2 (s) : 0≤ s ≤ t}. These information structures are defined by the following linear observation equations.
Information Structure of Local Controls
We assume that the initial condition x(0), the system Brownian motion E(x(0) ), Cov(x(0))) = (x 0 , P 0 ).
Pay-off Functional:
The distributed system is described in compact form by
By Theorem 1, the Hamiltonian is given by
and consequently, the optimal strategies are
(73)
where (x o (·), ψ o (·), q o 11 (·), q o 12 (·)) denote the solutions of the Hamiltonian system, corresponding to the optimal control u o , given by
Clearly, the previous equations illustrate the coupling between the two subsystems, since u 1,o is estimating the optimal decision of the other subsystem u 2,o as well as the adjoint processes ψ o from its own observations, and vice-versa. Next, we identify the martingale term in (76). Let {Φ(t, s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T } denote the transition operator of A(·) and Φ * (·, ·) that of the adjoint A * (·) of A(·). Then {ψ o (t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is given by (75) and its current value x o (t), then (77) can be expressed via
where Σ(·), β o (·) determine the operators to the one expressed via (77). Next, we determine the operators (Σ(·), β o (·)). Applying the Itô differential rule to both sides of (78), and then using (75), (76) and σ(t, x) = G(t), which implies V q o 11 (t) = 0, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], then we obtain
Notice that q o 12 is also predicted by applying Remark 2, which gives q o
Let φ(·) be any square integrable and F T −adapted matrixvalued process or scalar-valued processes, and define its filtered and predictor versions by 
The previous optimal decisions require the conditional estimates
These are obtained by taking conditional expectations of (77) giving
For any admissible decision, the filtered versions of x o (·) are given by the following stochastic differential equations [35] :
From the previous filtered versions of x o (·) it is clear that subsystem 1 estimates the actions of subsystem 2 based on its own observations, namely, π 1 (u 2,o )(·) and subsystem 2 estimates the actions of subsystem 1 based on its own observations, namely, π 2 (u 1,o )(·).
Define the innovation processes associated with {G y i,o 0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}, i = 1, 2 and their generated σ-algebras as follows:
Then by (89),
The predicted versions of x o (·) are obtained from (86) and (87) as follows. Utilizing the identity
Since {π 1 (x o )(s, t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T } is determined from (90) and its current value π 1 (x o )(t, t) = π 1 (x o )(t), and similarly
where K i (·) is a deterministic matrix-valued function, and r i (·) is an {G y i,o 0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}-adapted real-valued function, which determines the operators to the one expressed via (85), for i = 1, 2. Utilizing (94) into (83) and (84) then
, for i = 1, 2. Substituting the previous equations into (90)-(93) then
Then we can show that K i (·) satisfy (103), and r i (t) = π i (r i )(t, t), t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2 satisfy (99) and (100), shown at the bottom of the page.
To compare the optimal decentralized decisions with those found in [37] (this is done in Section IV-B), we introduce the following assumption regarding the measurability of admissible decisions U i [0, T ], i = 1, 2.
T ]}, i = 1, 2, and (86) has a strong {G I 1,o 0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}adapted solution π 1 (x o )(·) and (87) has a strong {G
Next, we state the following result. Theorem 4: Under the conditions of Assumptions 4 the optimal decisions (u 1,o , u 2,o ) are given
where π i (x o )(·), i= 1, 2 satisfy the filter equations (86) and (87) with π 1 (u 2,o )(·) = u 2,o (·)π 2 (u 1,o )(·) = u 1,o (·), and(K i (·), r i (·),
x o (·), u i,o (·)), i = 1, 2 solutions of the ordinary differential equations (103)-(107), shown at the bottom of the next page.
Proof: By invoking Assumptions 4, since y i,o (t) = t 0 (110) and (111) then K i (·), i = 1, 2 are identified by the operators
It is important to make the following observations. (O1): The optimal strategies or laws (101), (102) are precisely the optimal strategies obtained in [38] for noiseless decentralized information structures, although the filter equations for π i (x o )(·), i = 1, 2 given by (86) and (87) are nonlinear and may require higher order moments, leading to the so-called moment closure problem of nonlinear filtering.
(O2): In general, Assumptions 4 do not hold, because the innovations {I i (t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}, i = 1, 2 are correlated. Further analysis is required to understand this correlation. In Section IV-B, we consider decoupled dynamics as in [37] , we show that Assumptions 4 hold, and that the optimal decisions can be computed explicitly.
Next, we state similar results for distributed filtering. Corollary 2: Consider distributed filter dynamics (64), (65) with B (i) = 0, i = 1, 2 and LQF pay-off given in Definition 4. Then the optimal strategies (u 1,o , u 2,o ) are given by
for i = 1, 2. If we further assume the innovations are independent, then
Proof: (113) is obtained from Case LQF, i.e., set B (i) = 0, N = 2, and then use the fact that the observations and innovations generate the same filtrations. ii (t)dB i (t).
The optimal strategies are extensions of Theorem 4.
B. Connections to Mean Field Stochastic Control
Here, we show that Assumptions 4, and the optimal decentralized strategies of Theorem 4 hold, for variations of the mean field stochastic control problems investigated in [37] .
Consider the team problem defined by The mean field formulation of the above team problem, with dynamics (117), N pay-offs (instead of a single payoff), with each pay-off, say, the jth having coupling to the other subsystems states and controls, i.e., x i , u i , i ∈ Z N , i = j, only through mean field component of these controls and states, is investigated in [37] using Nash-equilibrium strategies. The main assumption in [37] , is that each control u i (t) is measurable with respect to centralized full information structure σ{x 1 (0), . . . , x N (0), {W 1 (s), . . . , W N (s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t}}, t ∈ [0, T ]. One of the main results derived in [37] , is that the optimal strategies are decentralized, given by u i,o (t) = μ i (t, x i,o (t), r i (t)), where μ i (t, ·, ·) is linear in x i,o (·), r i (·), and driven by mean field components, for i = 1, 2, . . . , N.
Next, we show that even with finite DMs, the optimal strategies of any one DM is finite-dimensional, and driven by mean field components of all other DM optimal responses, and states. Let ψ Vector{ψ 1 , . . . , ψ N }. For now, assume the coupling is only through R, which is nondiagonal, and let H = diag{H 11 , . . . , H NN }M = diag{M 11 , . . . , M NN } (the case of nondiagonal (H, M ) can be treated similarly).
By (73), (74), and (77), then
with Φ ii (·, ·) the transition operator of A ii (·), ∀ i ∈ Z N . Since the dynamics and observations are decoupled, the filters
satisfy, ∀ i ∈ Z N , the linear Kalman filter equations
where u i,o , i = 1, . . . , N are given by (120). For each of the above Kalman filters, the information generated by the innovations and observations is identical (Chapters 11, 12, [35] ), (122) has continuous strong solutions adapted to the innovations, when u i = 0, and that the innovations corresponding to different observations are independent (i.e., Assumptions 4 hold).
Consequently, the conditional expectations of all other actions appearing in (120) are unconditional, i.e., E{u j,o (t)|G y i,o 0,t } = E{u j,o (t)}, ∀ j ∈ Z N , j = i. Hence, the optimal decisions u i,o are obtained precisely as in (101), (102), and they are driven by mean field components of all other DMs optimal responses, as follows:
where K ii (·), r ii (·), x i,o (·) E{x i,o (·)}, u i,o (·) E{u i,o · } are simplified versions of (104)-(107), given bẏ
.E u j,o (t) = 0, r ii (T ) = 0, ∀ i ∈ Z N .
Remark 6: The above results can be generalized to team problems of LQF, in which case the optimal strategy of any one DM, say, u i,o (t), is a function of x o i (·) π i (x o )(·) ≡ E{x o (·)|G y i ,o 0,· }, for i ∈ Z N , driven by mean field components of the optimal state processes E{x j,o (t)}, j ∈ Z N , j = i.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we considered stochastic differential decision systems, with decentralized noisy information structures, and we derived sufficient team and person-by-person optimality conditions. Future research directions might include.
(F1) derivation of optimality conditions for other type of policies, such, as Nash-equilibrium and minimax; (F2) identifying information structures or finding the minimum common information necessary so that (86) and (87) are given by finite dimensional filters, i.e., Kalman filters.
